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1. Introduction	
 
During the last couple of decades, poverty has increasingly become an issue of global concern and 
interest. The Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) agreed by all UN members in 2000 has 
halving extreme poverty between 1990 and 2015 as its first goal. One year to the finish line, 
remarkable success has been recorded at the global level. The World Bank (2013) estimates that 
extreme poverty has been halved in developing regions already five years ahead of schedule, with 
the proportion of people living under 1.25 dollar a day having been reduced from 47 per cent in 
1990 to 22 per cent in 2010. 
 
However, the progress has according to estimates by the World Bank (2013) been uneven among 
countries and regions, with China and India being attributed most of the global poverty reduction 
and, most notably, Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) lagging behind with a modest drop from 56 to 48 per 
cent between 1990 and 2010. SSA is the only region that saw a steady increase in the number of 
people living in extreme poverty, rising from 290 million in 1990 to 414 million in 2010. Out of the 
27 countries that in 2010 are estimated to have extreme poverty rates at 40 percent or above, 26 are 
situated in SSA. This disappointingly low level of poverty reduction in SSA has occurred despite of 
relatively strong income growth. SSA had an unweighted average GDP growth of more than 5 % 
between 1995 and 20101. The Economist noted in December 2011 that “over the ten years to 2010, 
six of the world’s ten fastest-growing economies were in sub-Saharan Africa”. 
 
Strong growth performance and concurrent low poverty reduction, in particular in SSA, has given 
rise to a vast literature on drivers of pro-poor growth and the role of income distribution in the 
growth-poverty relationship. While it has been generally agreed that income growth is the main 
driver of poverty reduction, a debate has occurred during the last decade on how much attention 
should be paid to the levels and changes of income inequality when conducting poverty reducing 
strategies (see for example Basu 2013 or Ravallion 2007). Numerous studies have identified income 
inequality as an important factor in the relationship between income growth and poverty reduction 
(e.g. Ravallion, 1997; Easterly, 2000; Bourguignon, 2003; Kalwij and Verschoor, 2007; Fosu 2009). 
 
The literature is not always completely cohesive in its message though. For example, an influential 
study by Dollar and Kraay (2002) find that incomes of the poorest fifth of society grow proportion-
                                                 
1 Author’s calculations based on growth data from the International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Database 
October 2013, available from <http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2013/02/weodata/index.aspx> [11 June 2014]. 
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ally with average incomes, implying that the poor, on average and over time, benefits from growth 
just as much as the rest of society. The study does not exclude the possibility of a significant role of 
income inequality but simply implies that any effective poverty reduction strategy should have 
growth-enhancing policies at its very centre. The study could still perhaps have been contributing to 
the notion addressed in a study by Ravallion (2007) that “the only thing that really matters to reduc-
ing absolute income poverty is the rate of economic growth”, implying that little or no attention should 
be paid to levels or changes in income distribution. 
 
A growing number of studies and policy makers question this notion and point towards the im-
portance of income distribution in the growth-poverty nexus. Most notably, in 2013 the World Bank 
Group endorsed two new goals beyond the 2015 horizon, namely i) ending extreme poverty by 
2030 and ii) shifting focus from average economic growth to promoting income growth amongst the 
bottom 40 percent of people. Looking ahead, the World Bank Group (2014) acknowledges that 
growth alone, even if assumed to be quite strong, will not achieve the targeted poverty reduction by 
2030, but point towards the need for inclusive growth and adequate attention towards income ine-
quality and how it evolves. Going into the post-2015 era of poverty reduction, special attention 
might be required towards the growth-poverty-inequality nexus in the region with the most high 
poverty rate countries in the world, namely SSA. 
 
Against this backdrop, this thesis will revisit the empirical evidence on how the poverty-reducing 
effect of income growth is affected by income inequality. Further exploring the role of income ine-
quality in poverty reduction, we also examine how much poverty reduction we can expect from 
distributional changes in developing countries, i.e. the inequality elasticity of poverty. For the above 
mentioned reasons, we will do this with a particular focus on SSA to see if this region fits the global 
pattern of development or if we should have different expectations on what growth can achieve in 
SSA as compared to the rest of the world. 
 
Using the latest available World Bank country data on poverty, inequality, and mean income we 
create an unbalanced cross-country panel data for the period 1982 - 2011. The data is then applied 
to several recently used models to explain differences in poverty reduction and how income ine-
quality and its evolvement affect it. 
 
The thesis is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines the theoretical framework and past studies on 
the growth-poverty-inequality nexus. Section 3 presents the empirical method and the model to be 
used, including methodological problems associated with it. Section 4 first presents the data and 
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then presents and discusses the empirical results for the whole world as well as for SSA in 
comparison to the rest of world. Section 5 concludes by underlining some of the implications of our 
results. 
2. Theoretical	framework	and	past	studies	
 
This section will explore relevant theories and past studies on the interrelationship between growth, 
inequality and poverty reduction, with a particular focus on how income inequality affects the 
poverty reducing effect of income growth. As outlined by Thorbecke (2013), the interrelationship 
between growth, inequality and poverty has several causal links associated with it, all which are 
relevant for this study. It should be noted that the focus of this paper is poverty reduction, so the 
relationship between growth and inequality will only be touched upon in this section but not be 
tested empirically or analysed further in the subsequent sections of the paper.  
 
Our focus will be on absolute poverty2, and in particular the World Banks “dollar a day” poverty 
line which now translates into 1,25$/day or 38$/month, measured in 2005 PPP US-dollars. This 
measure, also referred to as the headcount poverty index, is equal to the proportion of people living 
on income levels below the poverty line. This is the poverty measure much at the centre of global 
poverty discussions at the moment, not the least because the World Bank’s aforementioned newly 
adopted poverty target is defined in this measure. However, while not being our main focus, we will 
also discuss two other common poverty measures, the poverty gap index and squared poverty gap 
index.3 
 
2.1. The	relationship	between	growth	and	inequality	
 
The most famous theoretical argument on growth’s effect on inequality was formulated by Simon 
Kuznets in the 1950s. Kuznets hypothesis was that growth initially increases inequality but 
decreases it after a certain level of average income is obtained, forming an inversed U-shaped 
pattern of inequality over time – the Kuznets curve. Kuznets argued that this was caused by dual 
economy dynamics between a poor, rural economy with relatively equal distribution of income on 
                                                 
2 We adhere only to absolute measures of poverty in this study, fully acknowledging that relative poverty measures 
could be an alternative. For a discussion on the implications of this choice, see for example Ravallion and Lokshin 
(2005). 
3The poverty gap index is a measure of the intensity of poverty and is equal to the income distance between the average 
income of the poor and the poverty line, expressed in proportion to the poverty line. The squared poverty gap index is 
said to measure the severity of poverty by putting even more weight on the income distance of the poor to the poverty. 
This is done by squaring the income distance to the poverty line for each observation/household.  
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the one hand, and a more modern, industrialized and unequal economy on the other (Kuznets, 1957). 
A developing nation’s transition from agriculture to industrial sector would increase inequality at 
first, because income would rise relatively quicker in urban areas, but then start to decrease once a 
certain level of urbanisation has been met. The theory has been intensively tested empirically but 
with mixed results (Acemoglu and Robinson 2002). 
 
A number of studies have found that growth has no correlation with changes in inequality, eg, 
Ravallion and Chen (1997), Ravallion (2001) and Dollar and Kraay (2002). Empirical evidence thus 
seems to suggest that growth, on average, tends to be distribution neutral, at least in the short and 
medium term. In growing economies, income distribution seems to worsen just about as often as it’s 
improving. This finding is relevant for our study, because if all income levels on average grow at 
the same rate over time, absolute poverty theoretically must decrease if mean income rises, perhaps 
leading one to conclude that the main policy focus should be on how to achieve high income growth 
and less attention should be given to the level and changes of inequality. 
 
There are however a number of reasons for caution when interpreting these results. For example, as 
pointed out by Ravallion (2007), considerable measurement error is likely in some of the data used 
in the above studies. Also, more recent evidence suggests that growth trends during the 1990s and 
beyond have put a slight upward pressure on inequality (Lopez, 2005 and Ravallion 2007). One 
should also keep in mind that the result does not imply that all kinds of growth stimulating policies 
are distribution neutral. For example, a study by Lundberg and Squire (2003) find that trade 
openness tend to increase income inequality. Furthermore, the results only focuses on the average 
growth process and does not take into account the high cross-country variation of poverty reduction 
generated by growth, something we will come back to in section 2.2. 
 
Regarding the reversed causal link, from inequality to growth, most studies seem to conclude that 
inequality has a detrimental effect on growth. There are however conflicting theories on the issue. 
 
The credit market imperfection theory argues that inequality hampers growth because low income 
individuals tend to under-invest in human and physical capital due to their more limited access to 
investment. A higher proportion of low-income individuals, ceteris paribus, will therefore generate 
less aggregated investment and thus lower growth (see for example Banarjee and Newman, 1993 
and Galor and Zeira, 1993). There are also political economy channels in which initial inequality is 
argued to hamper growth. Alesina and Rodrik (1994) and Persson and Tabellini (1991) argues that 
higher initial inequality leads the “median voter” to support income redistribution, i.e. higher rates 
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of distortionary taxes, which will lead to lower rates of growth. Inequality might also lead to 
economic and political instability that in turn will hamper investment and growth (Alesina and 
Perotti, 1996), or impede on the social cohesion that enhances a country's resilience to volatility in 
the external environment (Rodrik 1999). 
 
On the other hand, several theories argue that inequality has a positive effect on income growth. 
Lazear and Rosen (1981) argue that that inequality generates incentives for entrepreneurship and 
innovation. Barro (2000) argue that in poor countries, high inequality might generate positive 
effects on growth if it allows at least a few people to accumulate the minimum capital needed to 
start a business. Kaldor (1957) points to the fact that rich people tend to save a larger proportion of 
their income and argue that higher inequality therefore will raise aggregate investment and as a 
result income growth. 
 
Turning to the empirical evidence on the issue, most results generally supports the view that 
inequality has a negative effect on growth, but a non-negligible part of the literature finds either 
some evidence for the opposite or no systematic relationship what so ever.4  
 
For the purpose of the empirical tests in this study, we will lean on the ambiguous empirical and 
theoretical results in previous research and assume that there is no correlation or systematic 
relationship between growth and inequality. 
 
2.2. Inequality	and	the	growth	elasticity	of	poverty	
 
While the conclusion that absolute poverty tends to fall with income growth is unsurprising, 
empirical evidence shows that there is a wide variation as to how much poverty reduction a certain 
level of growth generates. For example, using a dataset of 117 poverty spells in 47 countries 
Ravallion (2001) estimates that a three per cent growth rate will generate a poverty headcount drop 
by anywhere between a modest 1.8 percentage points and a dramatic 10.5 points the first year. The 
empirical literature tells us that most of the variation in the poverty reducing effect of income 
growth, i.e. the growth elasticity of poverty, can be attributed to either initial levels or changes in 
inequality. (e.g. Ravallion, 1997; Easterly, 2000; Bourguignon, 2003; Kalwij and Verschoor, 2007; 
Ferreria 2010; Thorbecke 2013;). 
 
                                                 
4For a good and recent overview of the empirical findings of the issue, see IMF (2014) or Ferreira (2010) 
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Initial inequality 
Intuitively, it seems clear that a higher level of inequality implies that an increase in income, 
holding relative distribution constant, will result in a lower rate of absolute poverty reduction. If the 
poor has a relatively small share of a countries total income, they will also tend to be accrued a 
relatively small share of any income rise. Fosu (2009) and Ravallion (1997) find that initial 
inequality, measured as the gini-coefficient at the start of a growth period, affects the income 
elasticity of poverty. 
 
Theoretically, as shown by Ravallion (2007), it is somehow ambiguous as to how the growth 
elasticity of poverty reduction is affected by the level of inequality. The way poverty responds to 
increases in income when distribution is held constant depends on the exact shape of the 
distribution function as well as on the mean level of income in relation to the absolute poverty line. 
More specifically, it depends on the cumulative distribution function evaluated at the poverty line, 
as illustrated in Figure 1. The top graph of Figure 1 illustrates two countries at the beginning of a 
growth period, country a and country b, that has the same headcount poverty rate, the same mean 
income level, but different cumulative distribution functions, i.e. country a is more equal than 
country b. The bottom graph illustrates the same countries after a distribution neutral rise in the 
mean income. Given the steeper slope of the cumulative distribution function at the poverty line in 
country a compared to country b, the resulting poverty reduction of any income rise, ceteris paribus, 
will be higher in the more equal country a. Hence, as is illustrated in the bottom graph of Figure 1, 
the resulting poverty rate after the growth period will be lower in country a. One can also note that 
the slope of the distribution function at the poverty line will also be affected by the actual level of 
mean income, implying that the initial level of mean income in relation to the absolute poverty line 
will affect the income elasticity of poverty.  
 
Looking at the empirical evidence, past research tells us that a higher level of initial inequality 
lowers the effect that any subsequent income growth has on absolute poverty (Thorbecke, 2013). In 
other words, a given level of growth will generally result in higher poverty reduction if income is 
equally distributed and lower poverty reduction if income is unequally distributed in society. 
Likewise however, as Ravallion (1997) points out, the adverse impact that economic contraction has 
on the poor also seem to decrease with higher inequality. 
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Changing inequality 
That growth tends to be distribution neutral on average does not mean that it doesn’t change but 
only that it rises just about as often as it falls in growing economies. Irrespective of the initial level 
of inequality in a given country, the poverty reducing effect of income growth can be offset by 
concurrent negative changes in income distribution. For example, as shown by Datt and Ravallion 
(1992), growth in Brazil during the 1980s was entirely offset by worsening income distribution, 
resulting in the headcount index of poverty remaining unchanged at 26,5% during the whole decade. 
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Any poverty reduction can be attributed to two main sources, either changes in mean income or 
changes in the distribution of income. Figure 2 illustrates a country which raises mean income and 
decreases inequality at the same time, making it possible to quantify the poverty reducing effects for 
improvements in inequality (black area) and changes in mean income (grey area). 
 
It should be noted that in extremely poor countries where the absolute poverty line is above mean 
income, we can expect that a decrease in inequality, holding mean income constant, could actually 
exacerbate headcount poverty because in such economy high inequality would enable at least a 
small proportion of the population to have incomes levels above the poverty line. This would imply 
that for extremely poor countries, raising income growth should be the main focus if the aim is to 
lower the headcount poverty rate. However, looking at the other poverty measures, like the poverty 
gap or squared poverty gap, worsening inequality would make the poor fewer but more worse off, 
something that could either raise or lower those poverty measures, depending on the shape of the 
distribution function and the mean income in relation to the poverty line. This point illustrates a 
major weakness of solely using the headcount poverty measure as it does not capture the depth or 
severity of the existing poverty, but only how many people falls below a certain income threshold.   
 
Looking at the empirical evidence, one finds that increasing inequality has on average had quite 
substantial negative effect on the growth elasticity of poverty reduction. Ravallion (2001), for 
example, finds that for growing economies with falling inequality, the poverty headcount index 
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declined with a median rate of 10 percent per year, while growing economies with rising inequality 
only had a 1 percent per year decline in absolute poverty. 
 
In conclusion, theoretical and empirical evidence suggests that progressive distributional changes 
will affect the pace of poverty reduction in two ways. First, for a given level of income, poverty will 
immediately decrease through the shift of resources from the rich to the poor. Second, progressive 
distributional changes will lead to a lower level of inequality and, as explained above, increase the 
poverty-reducing effect of any future growth process. We now move on to test these findings on the 
latest available data. 
 
3. Empirical	method	
 
We follow most of the literature when deriving the estimating equation for poverty. For illustrative 
purposes and following Kalwij and Verchoor (2007) we start by using a simple model estimating 
the growth elasticity of poverty without including distributional changes: 
 
 pit = b1 + b2yit + εit  (1) 
 
where i is a country index, p is the growth rate of the proportion of people living under the poverty 
line, y is the growth rate in mean income, and ε is the error term. Both variables are annualized 
growth rates between observation year t and the closest year-observation available before that, t-1. 
Ravallion and Chen (1997) call this the ‘empirical’ elasticity, as the estimated growth elasticity will 
be consistent with actual changes in inequality. However, as illustrated in section 2.2., any change 
in the headcount poverty index can be decomposed into i) a change in the mean income and ii) a 
change in the distribution of income. A way to test this identity on empirical data is to extend model 
(1) to also include changes in the distribution of income. Such a model can be written as 
 
pit = b1 + b2yit + b3git + εit  (2) 
 
where g is the growth in inequality measured as the Gini-coefficient (Bourguignon, 2003). This 
model is consistent with the identity linking poverty reduction to either changes in mean income or 
income distribution. It does however take the inequality and growth elasiticies of poverty to be 
constant over different levels of income and for different levels of inequality. As was illustrated in 
Figure 1, the growth elasticity of poverty will be affected by the exact shape of the distribution 
function evaluated at the poverty line, which in turn can be affected by both the level of inequality 
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and the level of mean income. An improved version of equation (2) is therefore to add the initial 
level of inequality at the start of the growth spell as well as the initial level of mean income. A 
recently common fully specified model including these variables and based on the assumption that 
income is log-normally distributed can be written as: 
 
pit = b1 + b2yit + b3git + b4yitGi + b5yit(Z/Yi) + b6gitGi + b7git(Z/Yi) + b8Gi + b9(Z/Yi) + εit  (3) 
 
where Gi is the initial level of inequality at the start of the period, Z/Yi is the initial ratio of the 
poverty line Z and the initial level of the mean income Yi (eg., Bourguignon (2003), Kalwij and 
Verschoor (2007) and Fosu (2011). All growth variables are expressed in logarithmic changes and 
all level variables are expressed in natural logarithms. 
 
Derived from the theoretical framework presented in section 2, the following hypothesis is 
associated with the above models. When mean income growth increases, poverty growth decreases, 
hence the sign of b2 is expected to be negative. Increased growth in inequality is by definition 
increasing poverty in most economies, ceteris paribus, so b3 is expected to be positive. b4 is 
expected to be positive, because a higher level of initial inequality Gi is assumed to decrease the 
poverty-reducing effect of income growth y. A higher initial level of income, here represented by a 
lower value of (Z/Yi), is expected to increase the poverty-reducing effect of income growth y, hence 
the value of b5 is expected to be positive (Bourguignon 2003). The sign of b6 is somewhat more 
unclear but might be expected to be negative, so that the negative effect that worsening inequality 
has on poverty increases with higher initial levels of inequality. The sign of b7 might also be 
expected to be negative, so that countries with lower income might see poverty increase with 
improving distribution because it increases the likelihood of people falling below the poverty line, 
as commented on in section 2.2. b8 and b9 is expected to be positive, because increased initial 
inequality and lower initial income is assumed to increase poverty. 
 
From equation (3), it is possible to derive the elasticities of income growth and changes in 
inequality on poverty reduction: 
 
Ey = b2 + b3Gi + b4(Z/Yi) + εit  (4) 
 
Eg = b5 + b6Gi + b7(Z/Yi) + εit  (5) 
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Since SSA is of particular interest in this thesis, we also test the equivalence model 1-3 for SSA 
versus non-SSA to see if the region fits the global pattern of poverty reduction. 
 
3.1. Methodological	problems	
 
Several potential problems with the application of this model to our data set should be noted. As 
specified by Kalwij and Vershoor (2007), the error term and the explanatory variables may be 
correlated for several reasons. Firstly, since income and poverty estimates are derived from the 
same income survey data, we have reason to believe that errors in estimates of income is correlated 
with the error term in the model. Secondly, there might be unobserved factors that varies over time 
that effects both poverty and growth which, if ignored, will result in an omitted variable bias. Lastly, 
the household data that we rely upon have measurement errors which, due to improved survey 
methods (Chen and Ravallion, 2004), likely have decreased over time and therefore will yield us a 
spurious relationship between growth and poverty. 
 
It's also important to underline that causality is likely to also run in the opposite direction than 
assumed in the above model, that is, from poverty to growth. The theoretical arguments for this link 
are to a large extent overlapping with those arguing for a link from inequality to growth. Perry et al 
(2006) finds that poverty impedes and dampens income growth for a number of reasons. First, poor 
people are likely to be less productive because they often suffer from bad health and/or low-quality 
education, which lower their human capital stock. Second, lower human capital stock also 
diminishes prospects for migration and mobility. Third, extreme poverty and high income inequality 
might give rise to exacerbated political, ethnic or racial conflicts which in turn is likely to hamper 
income growth. Fourth, poor people and regions have more limited access to financial markets and 
other essential elements necessary for economic development and investment, such as infrastructure 
and property rights. Lastly, poor people tend to underinvest in human capital because they are more 
vulnerable to labour market risks. 
 
Another problem will be if the growth variable is correlated with the gini-coefficient. As stated in 
section 2.1., this study will lean on the ambiguous empirical and theoretical results in past studies 
and assume that this is not the case. 
 
Because of the risk of reversed causality in our model, or correlation between our explanatory 
variables and the error term, there is a need to use instrument variables. However, due to difficulties 
in obtaining usable instrument variables for our model, we are forced to rely on regular ordinary 
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least square regression analysis in this study. This restriction will put our results into serious 
question. A discussion on the possible use of instrument variables in our model is further explored 
in Annex 4. 
 
4. Data	and	results	
 
The data used in this analysis is taken from the most recently available World Bank global 
database.5 Based on national household survey data on mean income, 801 unbalanced observations 
are available for some 120 countries. Each observation contains information on the poverty 
headcount, poverty gap, poverty squared gap, and the Gini-index of inequality. 
 
Depending on the country and type of household survey, mean income is either estimated from 
household income or consumption. Past studies identify household consumption as a far better 
estimation of current economic welfare than income. Surveys measuring consumption are more 
likely to be reported accurately, partly because pure income data might be considered private and 
sensitive information, and therefore incline people to report data below their true value. 
Consumption based surveys also requires fewer assumptions and have fewer nonresponses (see for 
example, Ravallion (1992) and Deaton and Zaidi (2002)). Therefore, consumption estimates are 
generally preferred in this study. Nonetheless, income estimates are accepted here because we are 
only interested in the percentage change over time. However, we do discard all poverty spells where 
the survey changes from an expenditure to and income survey or vice versa. 
 
We discard countries where only one observation is available, making it impossible to construct a 
poverty spell. We also discard all observations that have missing values on any of the variables, all 
observations who are not nationally representative and all observations where the headcount 
poverty is negligible.6 
 
There are likely to be substantial measurement errors in these spells due to incomparability between 
different household surveys. Extreme and implausible values exist. For example, Moldova reports 
an annual growth rate in mean income of around staggering 53% between 2005 and 2006. To tackle 
this problem somewhat, we drop all observations that report the highest and lowest 5% in the 
                                                 
5 The World Bank global database is available at http://go.worldbank.org/NT2A1XUWP0 
6 We follow the example of Kraay (2005) and define ”negligible” as less than 2 percent. 
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distribution of either income growth or changes in the poverty headcount.7 
 
This yields us a total of 364 poverty spells in 80 countries spanning almost three decades, from 
1982 to 2011. 89 of these observations are SSA and 545 are non-SSA. There are 31 SSA and 49 
non-SSA countries in the sample. 
 
While our main focus will be on the World Banks “dollar a day” headcount poverty index, we do 
however also present and discuss results for the other common poverty measures, the poverty gap 
index and squared poverty gap index. Following related literature and also much dependent on the 
availability of data, we use the Gini-coefficient as the measure of inequality in this study. 
 
4.1. Empirical	finding	at	the	global	level	
 
Table 1 present the regression results for the whole sample of countries. Looking at the results of 
equation (1), we see that growth alone only can explain around 20% of changes in poverty 
reduction. Adding changes of income inequality in equation (2), we can now explain 48% of the 
cross-country changes in poverty reduction, implying that movements in inequality are indeed an 
important part of the growth-poverty story. The fully specified model (3) raises the explanatory 
power to 61%, indicating that initial inequality and income level also matters. This rise of R2 when 
we expand the poverty model follows the same pattern as for Fosu (2011), who uses a similar but 
slightly smaller dataset.  
 
All coefficients have the positive or negative sign we expected. Our test confirms that income 
growth is an important factor explaining poverty reduction. Studying the reduced model (1) we find 
an income elasticity of -1.1 for our global data set and a little larger, -1.3, when controlled for 
changes in inequality in model (2). We note that this is substantially lower than for example Kalwij 
and Vershoor (2007) which estimates the income elasticity in model (1) at -2.32, although it should 
be noted that they use the two-dollar-a-day absolute poverty line and a much smaller dataset. Fosu 
(2011) on the other hand finds a much lower growth elasticity, -0.33, using the same poverty line as 
we are and a much more similar dataset.  
 
Studying model (2) and (3) we confirm previous findings that inequality plays a significant role in 
the growth-poverty nexus. A higher initial level of inequality negatively affects the income elasticity 
                                                 
7 This follows a similar method used by Kraay (2005). In our dataset, we end up dropping all observations who report 
annual growth rates outside the span -13% and 17%, and annual headcount poverty changes outside -36% and 35%. 
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of poverty reduction and worsening inequality raises poverty (b3 and b4 are significantly positive). 
 
Table 1 – Regression results for the whole world 
Variable/model (1) (2) (3) 
b1 (constant) -0.022 a
(-3.61) 
-0.011 b
(-2.22) 
-0.114 
(-1.15) 
b2 (dlog yit) -1.073a
(-9.61) 
-1.282 a
(-14.06) 
-7.309 a 
(-4.40) 
b3 (dlog git)  1.916 a
(14.03) 
5.458 b 
(2.33)
b4 (dlog yit * dlog Gi(t-1))  
 
1.634 a 
(3.63) 
b5 (dlog yit * dlog (Z/Y)i(t-1)  
 
0.348 b 
(2.33) 
b6 (dlog git * dlog Gi(t-1))  
 
-1.336 b 
(-2.12) 
b7 (dlog git * (Z/Y)i(t-1))  
 
-1.782 a 
(-9.32) 
b8 (dlog Gi(t-1))  
 
0.029 
(1.06) 
b9 (dlog (Z/Y)i(t-1))  
 
0.004 
(0.56) 
N 364 364 364 
R2 0.2 0.48 0.61 
t-values in brackets 
a = 0.01 significance; b = 0.05 significance; c = 0.10 significance 
 
From the results, we derive equation (3) and (4) to see how the income and inequality elasticities 
are affected by initial levels of income and inequality: 
 
Ey = -7.309 + 1.634Gi + 0.348(Z/Yi)  (7) 
 
Eg = 5.458 + -1.336Gi + -1.782(Z/Yi)   (8) 
 
Consistent with previous literature, we find that countries with low inequality and high income 
relative to the absolute poverty line are on average expected to be more successful in translating 
subsequent income growth into poverty reduction. We also find that countries with higher initial 
inequality and lower initial income level would be less efficient in combating absolute poverty by 
decreasing inequality.  
 
Turning to the results for the poverty gap and squared poverty gap indices, presented in Annex 1, 
we find a similar story. We note that income growth alone seem to explain less than ten percent of 
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the change in these poverty measures while model (2) and (3), with inequality added to the picture, 
shows explanatory powers of around 40 percent or above. All coefficients have the sign expected 
but significance seems to weaken for most of them moving to the higher order of poverty measures. 
In particular, we note that the significance of b4 and b7, i.e. the effect of initial inequality on the 
income and inequality elasticities, weakens in the poverty gap model and disappears when we use 
the poverty squared index. This finding is similar to that of Fosu (2009) which finds a weaker role 
of initial inequality in the higher order poverty measures than in the headcount measure. In the same 
vein, we find that the role of initial mean income in relation to the poverty line seem to diminish 
when moving to the higher order poverty measures. This seems relatively intuitive, since the slope 
of the distribution function at the poverty line will be less relevant when giving more weight to the 
people living at income levels far below the poverty line. Looking at the effect of changes in 
inequality on poverty, b3, we do however find a significant effect for all poverty measures.  
 
4.2. How	does	SSA	fit	the	global	pattern?	
 
So, how does SSA fit into the global pattern? Table 2 presents each model once again, but with SSA 
separated from the rest of the world. The first column under each model presents the results for non-
SSA, whereas the second column presents the difference between SSA and non-SSA for each 
coefficient. Hence, the SSA coefficient is the non-SSA coefficient plus the SSA difference figure. 
 
Studying model (2) in Table 2, we find that the income elasticity of poverty is significantly lower in 
SSA compared to the rest of the world. We conduct a Chow test to test the equivalence of the 
regressions for non-SSA versus SSA and can reject the null hypothesis that the regressions for the 
two regions are equivalent at the 1% level of significance. In other words, any rise in mean income 
will generate significantly less poverty reduction in SSA compared to the rest of the world. 
Likewise, we find that any reduction in income inequality will generate significantly less poverty 
reduction in SSA as compared to non-SSA. 
 
However, once the poverty function is fully specified in model (3), our results indicate that any of 
the difference in the income and inequality elasticities between SSA and the rest of world can be 
attributed to differences in initial levels of inequality and initial levels of income in relation to the 
absolute poverty line. Conducting a Chow test once again, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that 
the fully specified regressions for non-SSA and SSA are equivalent. Hence, we can conclude that 
the reason we can expect less poverty reduction for any given level of income growth or reduction 
of inequality in SSA is because SSA is poorer and more unequal from the outset. 
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Table 2 – Comparing Sub-Saharan Africa with the rest of the world 
Variable/model (1) (2) (3) 
Non-SSA SSA 
difference 
Non-SSA SSA 
difference 
Non-SSA SSA 
difference 
b1 (constant) -0.026a 
(-3.72) 
0.014 
(1.00) 
-0.0108b
(-2.00) 
0.002 
(0.22) 
-0.140 
(-1.03) 
0.129 
(0.51) 
b2 (dlog yit) -1.141a 
(-9.32) 
0.408 
(1.39)
-1.478a
(-15.78)
0.732a
(3.33)
-6.625a 
(-3.49) 
2.347 
(0.41) 
b3 (dlog git) 
  
2.617a
(16.62)
-1.900a
(-7.19)
6.388b 
(2.09) 
-7.994 
(-1.11) 
b4 (dlog yit * dlog Gi(t-1)) 
    
1.314b 
(2.41) 
-0.399 
(-0.26) 
b5 (dlog yit * dlog (Z/Y)i(t-1)
    
-0.007 
(-0.03) 
0.848 
(1.57) 
b6 (dlog git * dlog Gi(t-1)) 
    
-1.561c 
(-1.74) 
2.090 
(1.08) 
b7 (dlog git * (Z/Y)i(t-1)) 
    
-1.750a 
(-4.11) 
0.277 
(0.34) 
b8 (dlog Gi(t-1)) 
    
0.037 
(0.93) 
-0.035 
(-0.50) 
b9 (dlog (Z/Y)i(t-1)) 
    
0.008 
(0.51) 
-0.005 
(-0.21) 
N 364 364 364 
R2 0.21 0.56 0.62 
t-values in brackets 
a = 0.01 significance; b = 0.05 significance; c = 0.10 significance 
 
This finding is consistent with that of Kalwij and Vershoor (2007) and Fosu (2011), but however not 
consistent with the findings of Fosu (2009) who finds significantly lower income and inequality 
elasticities of poverty in SSA compared to non-SSA, also when initial inequality and initial mean 
income is added to the model. Looking at the higher order poverty measures, presented in Annex 3, 
we find similar results but much fewer significant variables also when comparing to the global 
dataset, with the fully specified model showing very few significant variables for the poverty gap 
and squared poverty gap measures.  
 
To get the magnitude of the difference between income and inequality elasticities in SSA and non-
SSA that can attributed to levels of inequality and mean income, we move back to model (2) which 
tells us that on average, SSA has a growth elasticity of poverty of -0.746, significantly lower than 
the -1.478 estimated for the rest of the world. In other words, a one per cent increase in mean 
income is estimated to generate a 0.75 per cent decrease in the poverty headcount rate in SSA, 
whereas the same rate of growth on average is expected to generate about 1.5 per cent poverty 
headcount drop in the rest of the world. In a similar way, the inequality elasticity of poverty is 2.617 
in non-SSA while being as low as 0.717 in SSA. The ratios between non-SSA/SSA in the income 
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and inequality elasticities are 2.0 and 3.65, respectively, indicating that income growth is relatively 
more efficient than reductions in inequality in SSA compared to non-SSA. In other words, because 
countries in the SSA are more unequal and poorer from the outset, they should on average be more 
focused than the rest of the world on achieving high income growth as compared to reductions in 
inequality. This finding is similar to Fosu (2009) which observe non-SSA/SSA ratios of income and 
inequality elasticities of 2.6 and 4.5, respectively.  
 
It should be underlined that there is a wide variety to levels of inequality and mean income in SSA 
which is not caught in the above elasticity estimates. We therefore add the levels of inequality and 
mean income to the equation and estimate elasticities for each SSA country using our global 
estimate for equation (7) and (8). This will yield us estimates for each countries prospects for 
reducing poverty by either improving income distribution or increasing income growth. The results 
are presented in Table 3 and illustrate the wide variety in elasticities due to large cross-country 
differences in initial inequality and income level. The income elasticities ranges from 0.69 for 
Zambia to 1.73 for Tanzania and the inequality elasticities ranges from -0.14 for Madagascar and 
3.33 for South Africa.  
 
Table 3 – Estimated growth and inequality elasticities for Sub-Saharan countries 
Country Income 
elasticity 
Inequality 
elasticity 
     
Angola -1,33 1,25  Mali -1,66 1,14  
Botswana -1,01 2,13  Mauritania -1,54 1,94  
Burkina Faso -1,42 1,23  Mozambique -1,13 0,72  
Burundi -1,49 0,29  Namibia -0,98 2,3  
Cameroon -1,71 2,55  Niger -1,63 1,31  
Central African Republic -0,83 0,61  Nigeria -1,36 0,88  
Côte d'Ivoire -1,51 1,97  Rwanda -0,99 0,71  
Ethiopia -1,73 1,6  Senegal -1,5 1,72  
Gambia, The -1,27 1,68  Sierra Leone -1,56 1,1  
Ghana -1,43 1,77  South Africa -1,2 3,33  
Guinea -1,45 1,27  Swaziland -1,13 1,52  
Guinea-Bissau -1,56 1,12  Tanzania -1,37 0,56  
Kenya -1,18 1,27  Togo -1,55 1,79  
Lesotho -1,06 1,32  Uganda -1,32 1,44  
Madagascar -1,01 -0,14  Zambia -0,69 0,08  
Malawi -1,18 0,67      
N.B. For each country we use the most recently available data for mean income and income inequality. The reported 
estimated elasticities are therefore based on country data spanning from 1993 for Botswana to 2011 for Senegal. Most 
of the estimates are however from 2000 or later. The exact years for every country can be found in Annex 3.  
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Not surprisingly, and consistent with previous literature, we conclude that poverty reducing 
strategies in SSA must be tailored after country-specific circumstances, especially regarding the 
initial level of inequality and mean income. Madagascar illustrates the importance of this point, 
reporting a poverty headcount rate of staggering 81 per cent in 2010 and therefore, and as touched 
upon in section 2.2., would actually increase the proportion of people living below the extreme 
poverty line if income inequality was to improve with no concurrent income growth. Clearly, 
increasing income growth must be at the very heart of the poverty reducing policy strategy in such 
economy. 
	
5. Conclusions	
This thesis has revisited the empirical evidence on how the poverty reducing effect of income 
growth is affected by inequality, with a particular focus on SSA and whether this region fits the 
global pattern of development. Using the latest available World Bank data on poverty, inequality, 
and mean income we created an unbalanced cross-country panel data for 80 developing countries 
during the period 1982 – 2011. We use this data on several models with three different poverty 
measures as the dependent variable and the explanatory variables involving the PPP-adjusted mean 
income and the gini-coefficient of inequality. We also estimated the responsiveness of poverty to 
changes in inequality.  
 
The thesis confirms previous findings that the income elasticity of poverty reduction is depending 
on both the initial level of inequality and the initial level of income. Higher levels of inequality and 
lower levels of income tend to reduce the poverty reducing effect of any future income growth. We 
also find that SSA countries on average suffers from substantially lower responsiveness of poverty 
to both income growth and improvements in inequality, but finds that this difference can be 
attributed to the fact that SSA is poorer and more unequal than the rest of the world from the outset. 
Additionally, we estimated the responsiveness of poverty to changes in inequality and find that 
worsening inequality exacerbates poverty and that this effect is increasing with higher initial levels 
of inequality and lower initial levels of mean income.  
 
Our results should however be interpreted with caution due to methodological and econometric 
weaknesses in our analysis, most notably because of the risk of endogenous variables in our models 
and non-neglible measurement errors in the household surveys on which our dataset is based. 
 
Looking behind the average in our region of interest, we find a wide variety in income and 
inequality elasticities between SSA countries, implying that poverty reducing strategies needs to be 
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tailored for country-specific circumstances and poverty profiles. By outlining estimates for the 
prospects of poverty reduction for SSA countries, we provide a useful starting point for more 
country specific analysis and further understanding of the drivers of poverty reduction, inequality 
and pro-poor growth.  
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Appendix	
Annex	1	–	Regression	results	for	poverty	gap	index	
 
Table 3 – regression results for the whole world 
Variable/model (1) (2) (3) 
b1 (constant) -0,030a
(-3,16) 
-0,012
(-1,64) 
-0,086
(-0,54) 
b2 (dlog yit) -1,128a
(-6,69) 
-1,448a
(-10,61) 
-7,067a
(-2,64) 
b3 (dlog git)  2,937a
(14,36) 
47,350c
(1,94) 
b4 (dlog yit * dlog Gi(t-1))  
 
1,396c
(1.92) 
b5 (dlog yit * dlog (Z/Y)i(t-1)  
 
-0,058
(-0,26) 
b6 (dlog git * dlog Gi(t-1))  
 
-1,623
(-1,60) 
b7 (dlog git * (Z/Y)i(t-1))  
 
-1,983a
(-6,43) 
b8 (dlog Gi(t-1))  
 
0,021
(0,48)
b9 (dlog (Z/Y)i(t-1))  
 
0,003
(0,22)
N 364 364 364 
R2 0.1 0.43 0.50 
t-values in brackets 
a = 0.01 significance; b = 0.05 significance; c = 0.10 significance 
 
Table 4 – Comparing Sub-Saharan Africa with the rest of the world 
Variable/model (1) (2) (3) 
Non-SSA SSA difference Non-SSA SSA difference Non-SSA SSA difference 
b1 (constant) -0,0325a 
(3,02) 
0,0126 
(0,57) 
-0,010
(-1,23) 
0,002 
(1,23)
-0.126 
(-0.57) 
0.172 
(0.42) 
b2 (dlog yit) -1,109a 
(-5,97) 
-0,100
(-0,23)
-1,587a
(-10,83)
-0,352
(-1,02)
-5.189c 
(-1.69) 
-0.699 
(-0.08) 
b3 (dlog git) 
  
3,722a
(15,11)
-2,183a
(5,28)
5.780 
(1.17) 
-4.67 
(-0.40) 
b4 (dlog yit * dlog Gi(t-1)) 
    
0.647c 
(0.74) 
0.558c 
(0.23) 
b5 (dlog yit * dlog (Z/Y)i(t-1) 
    
-0.723 
(-1.79) 
1.651 
(1.90) 
b6 (dlog git * dlog Gi(t-1)) 
    
-1.010 
(-0.70) 
1.031 
(0.33) 
b7 (dlog git * (Z/Y)i(t-1)) 
    
-1.456b 
(-2.12) 
-0.142 
(-0.11) 
b8 (dlog Gi(t-1)) 
    
0.0353 
(0.55) 
-0.048 
(-0.43) 
b9 (dlog (Z/Y)i(t-1)) 
    
0.0106 
(0.42) 
0.001 
(0.03) 
N 364 364 364 
R2 0.10 0.47 0.49 
t-values in brackets 
a = 0.01 significance; b = 0.05 significance; c = 0.10 significance 
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Annex	2	–	Regression	results	for	squared	poverty	gap	index	
 
Table 5 – regression results for the whole world 
Variable/model (1) (2) (3) 
b1 (constant) -0,32a
(-2,59) -0,010 (-1,02) -0.014 (-0.06) 
b2 (dlog yit) -1,133a
(-5,08) -1,536
a
(-8,29) 
-7.069c 
(-1.90) 
b3 (dlog git)  3,700a
(3.45) 9.662
c 
(1.84) 
b4 (dlog yit * dlog Gi(t-1))  
 
1.271 
(1.26) 
b5 (dlog yit * dlog (Z/Y)i(t-1)  
 
-0.373 
(-1.19) 
b6 (dlog git * dlog Gi(t-1))  
 
-2.070 
(-1.47) 
b7 (dlog git * (Z/Y)i(t-1))  
 
-2.130 
(-4.97) 
b8 (dlog Gi(t-1))  
 
0.002 
(0.03) 
b9 (dlog (Z/Y)i(t-1))  
 
-0.001 
(-0.08) 
N 364 364 364 
R2 0.07 0.37 0.42 
t-values in brackets 
a = 0.01 significance; b = 0.05 significance; c = 0.10 significance 
 
Table 6 – Comparing Sub-Saharan Africa with the rest of the world 
Variable/model (1) (2) (3) 
Non-SSA SSA difference Non-SSA SSA difference Non-SSA SSA difference 
b1 (constant) -0.033b 
(-2,30) 
0,005 
(0,16) 
-0,006
(-0,50)
-0,011 
(-0,48) 
-0.075 
(-0.25) 
0.142 
(0.25) 
b2 (dlog yit) -1,049a 
(-4,27) 
-0,482 
(-0,82) 
-1,629a
(-8,05) 
0,0613 
(0,13) 
-4.261 
(-1.00) 
-1.958 
(-0.15) 
b3 (dlog git) 
  
4,517a
(13,27) 
-2,306a
(-4,04) 
7.120 
(1.04) 
-1.343 
(-0.08) 
b4 (dlog yit * dlog Gi(t-1)) 
    
0.187 
(0.15) 
1.012 
(0.30) 
b5 (dlog yit * dlog (Z/Y)i(t-1) 
    
-1.283b 
(-2.28) 
2.286c 
(1.88) 
b6 (dlog git * dlog Gi(t-1)) 
    
-1.150 
(-0.57) 
0.108 
(0.02) 
b7 (dlog git * (Z/Y)i(t-1)) 
    
-1.443 
(-1.51) 
-0.452 
(-0.25) 
b8 (dlog Gi(t-1)) 
    
0.024 
(0.27) 
-0.044 
(-0.28) 
b9 (dlog (Z/Y)i(t-1)) 
    
0.013 
(0.37) 
0.009 
(0.16) 
N 364 364 364 
R2 0.06 0.38 0.41 
t-values in brackets 
a = 0.01 significance; b = 0.05 significance; c = 0.10 significance 
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Annex	3	–	List	of	usable	household	surveys	by	region,	country	and	year	
Non-SSA countries Years 
Algeria 1988, 1995 
Armenia 1998, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2006, 2007, 2010                
Azerbaijan 1995, 2001 
Bangladesh 1983, 1985, 1988, 1991, 1995, 2000, 2005, 2010               
Belize 1993, 1994, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999                 
Bhutan 2003, 2007 
Bolivia 1990, 1993, 1997, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008         
Brazil 
 
1981, 1982, 1983, 1984, 1985, 1988, 1989, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 
1999, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009 
Cambodia 1994, 2004, 2007, 2008, 2009                  
Chile 1987, 1990, 1992, 1994, 1996, 1998, 2000                
Colombia 1992, 1996, 1999, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2007, 2009, 2010             
Costa Rica 
 
1981, 1986, 1989, 1990, 1991, 1992, 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 
1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2008, 2009 
Dominican Republic 
 
1986, 1989, 1992, 1996, 1997, 2000, 2001, 2003, 2007, 2008, 2009, 
2010           
Ecuador 1987, 1994, 1998, 2000, 2003, 2005, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010             
Egypt, Arab Rep. 1990, 1995 
El Salvador 
 
1991, 1995, 1996, 1998, 1999, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2007, 
2008           
Fiji 2002, 2008 
Georgia 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010         
Guatemala 1989, 1998, 2000, 2003                   
Guyana 1992, 1998 
Honduras 
 
1991, 1992, 1993, 1996, 1998, 1999, 2001, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 
2007, 2008, 2009         
Iran, Islamic Rep. 1986, 1990 
Kazakhstan 1996, 2001 
Kyrgyz Republic 1998, 2002, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011                 
Lao PDR 1992, 1997, 2002, 2008                   
Malaysia 1984, 1987, 1995                    
Mexico 1984, 1992, 1994, 1998, 2000, 2002, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2008, 2010         
Moldova, Rep. 1988, 1992, 2001, 2004                   
Morocco 1984, 1990, 1998, 2000, 2007                  
Nepal 1995, 2003, 2010                    
Nicaragua 1993, 1998, 2001, 2005                   
Pakistan 1987, 1990, 1996, 1998, 2001, 2004, 2005, 2007               
Panama 
 
1979, 1989, 1991, 1995, 1997, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 
2009, 2010          
Paraguay 1995, 1997, 1999, 2001, 2004, 2005, 2007, 2009, 2010              
Peru 
 
1985, 1994, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 
2007, 2008, 2009, 2010        
Philippines 1985, 1988, 1991, 1994, 1997, 2000, 2003, 2006, 2009              
Romania 2000, 2001, 2002                    
Sri Lanka 1985, 1990, 1995, 2002, 2006, 2009                 
Tajikistan 1999, 2003, 2007                    
Thailand 1981, 1988, 1990, 1992, 1996, 1998, 2000                
Timor-Leste 2001, 2007 
Tunisia 1985, 1990, 1995, 2000                   
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Turkey 1994, 2002, 2003, 2004                   
Turkmenistan 1988, 1993 
Venezuela, RB 1981, 1987, 1992, 1995, 1998, 1999, 2001, 2004               
Vietnam 1992, 1998, 2002, 2004, 2006, 2008                 
Yemen, Rep. 1998, 2005 
Angola 2000, 2008 
 
SSA countries 
 
 
Botswana 1985, 1993 
Burkina Faso 1994, 1998, 2003, 2009                   
Burundi 1992, 1998, 2006                    
Cameroon 1996, 2001, 2007                    
Central African Republic 1992, 2003, 2008                    
Côte d'Ivoire 1988, 1993, 1995, 1998, 2002, 2008                 
Ethiopia 1981, 1995, 1999, 2005, 2010                  
Gambia, The 1998, 2003 
Ghana 1987, 1988, 1991, 1998, 2005                  
Guinea 1994, 2003, 2007                    
Guinea-Bissau 1993, 2002 
Kenya 1992, 1994, 1997, 2005                   
Lesotho 1986, 1993, 2002                    
Madagascar 1980, 1993, 1997, 1999, 2001, 2005, 2010                
Malawi 1997, 2004, 2010                    
Mali 1994, 2001, 2006, 2010                   
Mauritania 1987, 1993, 1995, 2000, 2004, 2008                 
Mozambique 1996, 2002, 2007                    
Namibia 1993, 2003 
Niger 1992, 1994, 2005, 2007                   
Nigeria 1985, 1992, 1996, 2003, 2009, 2011                 
Rwanda 1984, 2000, 2005, 2010                   
Senegal 1991, 1994, 2001, 2005, 2011                  
Sierra Leone 2003, 2011 
South Africa 1993, 1995, 2000, 2005, 2008                  
Swaziland 1994, 2000, 2009                    
Tanzania 1991, 2000, 2007                    
Togo 2006, 2011 
Uganda 1989, 1992, 1996, 1999, 2002, 2005, 2009 
Zambia 1988, 1995 
	
	
	
	
 29 
 
Annex	4	–	Possible	instrument	variables	 	
 
Following in the footsteps of several previous studies (e.g. Kalwij and Vershoor, 2007 and Fosu, 
2011), we try to obtain usable instruments variables for changes in the mean income y. From the 
national accounts, we obtain the PPP-adjusted GDP per capita figure for our relevant years and 
countries, assuming that any error in this measure will not be correlated with errors in the household 
surveys used to estimate our poverty, inequality and income estimates. In addition to this, we also 
use the change in the size of the population as well as lagged values of the Gini-coefficient and 
mean income. We also follow the example of previous studies by including several interacting terms 
with the above mentioned instruments, as well as regional dummy variables for the SSA vs. non-
SSA model. We are forced to drop 5 variables due to lack of data on PPP-adjusted GDP per capita 
for Jamaica, but are still left with 359 usable observations compared with 364 in the OLS 
regressions.  
 
The results, which are not included in the thesis but can be obtained upon request, are very different 
from the OLS results and arguably implausible. At first, our instruments seem to perform relatively 
well on model (1) and (2), showing significant and plausible coefficients similar to our OLS 
estimates. We test the validity of all our instruments using the Hansen test and we cannot reject the 
null hypothesis that all instruments are valid. However, when the full model is specified we find no 
significant variables, not even for y, which leads us to conclude that something is wrong and that we 
are forced to rely on our OLS results. We note that this follows for example Fosu (2009) which do 
not use instruments in a similar model. 
